The dangers of Iran's growing involvement in the Red Sea consist of several possible threats:
1. By Iran's geographical - maritime closeness with Israel Tehran can streamline and improve its attack capabilities and espionage capabilities in the region.
2. An increased, and perhaps even permanent, presence of Iran in the sea area will increase deterrence towards Israel and may influence future decisions in the context of Israeli attacks against Iranian targets. In the event of an escalation with Iran, or even with its proxies, Israel will also have to take into account the Iranian presence threatening the Red Sea.
3. Iran's increased and even constant presence in the Red Sea region may facilitate Iran's support and backing for terrorist acts by its emissaries in the region: Ansar Allah, Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These threats may increase as the technologies of automation and artificial intelligence mature and become available and cheaper, so that terrorist organizations can more easily obtain them, and deploy them for Iranian-directed naval terrorism purposes.
4. Increased Iranian influence in the Red Sea could lead to a violation of the freedom of navigation of Israel and its allies in the region by disrupting and disrupting the passage of goods, and even military vessels.
In the event of an escalation between Israel and / or its allies to Iran, Tehran may greatly disrupt the supply of goods and energy to Israel and Europe. The alternative sea route for transporting goods in the region encircles the African continent and thus greatly prolongs and micromanages the duration of the voyage.
The required Israeli response
The State of Israel must address these possible threats and take steps to prevent - or at least reduce - Iranian influence in the Red Sea region. Israel must continue to cultivate relations with the Gulf states within the framework of the Abraham Accords and with the Horn of Africa countries, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia, with the support of the United States.
Cooperation should include joint naval exercises (such as the exercise in November), joint tours and cruises, reciprocal and public visits, the launch of joint military operations for anti-piracy and counter-terrorism missions in the region, and intelligence targeting of the region. Some of these operations need to be done under the auspices of the Central Command of the United States Army. The decision to transfer Israel to the Central American Command - instead of the European Command as it was until recently - will make the job easier.
A political summit should be considered that would deal with incandescence and coordination of positions and include a defense strategy in the Red Sea space under American auspices. Along with Israel's independent activities in maintaining its maritime and general security, Israel should encourage the establishment of an international enforcement mechanism with maritime policing powers, in case Tehran chooses to disrupt the supply of goods and energy to Israel and Europe.
Israel must also act within the framework of the IDF to prevent and thwart terrorist acts led by Iran (including transferring Iranian weapons to emissaries, and thwarting Iranian military operations against Israeli targets in the region). Israel must continue to disrupt Iran's espionage missions and prevent oil transportation to terrorist elements.
Summary
Iran has strategic interests in the Red Sea region. Iran's influence in the Red Sea region poses a danger to the State of Israel and its allies, and to the freedom of navigation in this region. Israel must work alongside its allies - led by the United States - against Iran's attempts to establish a naval outpost in the Red Sea. These actions should include elements from the political, diplomatic, security and economic spheres that will lead Iran to understand that the cost to it from its naval presence in this region will be very high.