(May 7, 2025 / JNS) A rash of unexplained blazes and blasts at sensitive industrial, port and alleged Islamic Republican Guard Corps-linked facilities across the Islamic Republic of Iran in recent days raised questions about internal security, regime competence and potential covert actions.

The series of fires and explosions plagued Iran through late April and early May 2025, striking critical infrastructure, including its primary maritime gateway, power plants and facilities linked by unconfirmed reports to its missile and drone programs.

The incidents, often left unexplained by Tehran or attributed to accidents, fueled intense speculation about their true cause, with sabotage strongly considered by some observers in some of the incidents, as the Iranian regime sought to downplay such possibilities.

The wave of incidents began with an explosion and fire on April 26 at the Shaheed Rajaei port at Bandar Abbas, on the southern Iranian coastline —a crucial hub for Iranian trade. Israel denied any role in the port blast.

The explosion occurred in a container that reportedly held chemicals imported from China for creating solid fuel for missiles. This was followed, according to an i24 report, on May 3 by a fire at the Montazer Ghaem Thermal Power Plant near Karaj in northern Iran.

A month earlier, on April 4, multiple reported incidents had occurred: a fire at a missile production facility in Tehran; a blaze in an industrial zone in Natanz, near Isfahan, a region known for its nuclear facilities; a fire at a motorcycle factory in Mashhad, reported to have links to the IRGC missile program; and another fire at the Mahmoudabad Industrial Zone in Qom, an area that also happens to house an underground uranium enrichment facility. 

The pattern persisted into May, with a fire reported on May 5 at an underground IRGC ammunition depot near Shiraz, southern Iran. 

On May 6, a fire broke out at a warehouse for motorcycle parts in Tehran. According to some media reports, this was the second fire related to motorcycle production in less than a week, noting that the factory that burned in Mashhad, northeast Iran, two days earlier (May 4) was connected to the IRGC and the production of missiles and UAVs.

Adding to the persistent issues at Bandar Abbas, a new, smaller fire was reported at the Shahid Rajaei port on May 5 near an oil tank, although it was said to have been quickly extinguished. Iranian authorities also announced on May 5 the arrest of two individuals in connection with the initial large explosion at the port. The economic toll of these incidents appeared substantial, with one senior Iranian official estimating on May 5 that the damage from the first Bandar Abbas port explosion alone exceeded $3 billion.

Dr. Saeed Ghasseminejad, a senior Iran and financial economics advisor at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, specializing in Iran’s economy and financial markets, sanctions, and illicit finance, told JNS on May 6 that the Bandar Abbas Port is Iran’s primary gateway for maritime exports and imports, handling around 80% of container shipments.

The port constitutes 57% of Iran’s sea trade capacity, particularly for oil-based products, 52% of which are exported through Bandar Abbas (while crude oil, a separate commodity, is exported through Kharj Terminal).

While sabotage is possible, he said, the regime itself has denied foul play, since acknowledging sabotage would force it to respond.

“The regime is pretty incompetent,” Ghasseminejad said. “Just yesterday, there was another fire at Bandar Abbas when they were trying to move things around. So it’s possible that it’s not sabotage. But given that it was Chinese chemicals for the missiles, the sabotage option is also possible. For now, we have not seen any evidence that it’s sabotage.”

Mysterious blasts at other facilities, such as a factory in Mashhad at a site linked by some to the IRGC, are “much more likely to be sabotage,” he added.

If the regime imported missile fuel to the port and kept it there, rather than transporting it inland to missile bases, and now it is gone, Iran’s leverage is severely degraded, said Ghasseminejad. He noted that on April 19, the Israeli Air Force struck, among other targets, mixing machines used to prepare solid missile fuel. This would mean that Iran’s overall missile capacity had been significantly harmed, as well as its leverage in nuclear talks with the United States, he assessed.

The chemicals may also have been prepared for export to Iran’s proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen, but the scenario of importing them for Iran’s missile program is more likely, he said.

“It reduces their leverage in general in the sense that the Americans see that this is a regime, whether it’s sabotage or incompetence, whose nuclear program can be dealt with in other ways,” he argued.

The repeated unexplained incidents at sensitive sites across Iran underscored a period of heightened vulnerability for the regime. Whether stemming from sophisticated covert operations, critical infrastructure failures exacerbated by mismanagement, or a combination of both, these fires exacted a significant toll on Iran’s strategic capabilities and economic stability. 

Tehran is left grappling not only with the immediate damage but also with questions about its internal security and the resilience of its critical national assets.

PHOTO: Use according to Section 27 A