Iran is ready to ramp up its military presence in Latin America to the detriment of U.S. partners and allies. Washington’s response will go a long way toward signaling to Iran’s leaders, and their Latin American allies, whether the United States is serious about countering the intrusion of one of the world’s most dangerous regimes into the Western Hemisphere.
On July 20, Iranian state media reported on a new bilateral defense agreement between Bolivia and Iran. That same day, a sanctioned Iranian cargo ship arrived in the Venezuelan port city of La Guaira to reportedly deliver hundreds of automobiles to the Maduro regime. A few days later, Iran-made fast attack craft and anti-ship missiles were on full display at the Venezuelan Navy’s bicentennial celebration, while Bolivia’s defense minister confirmed that their agreement with Iran includes the transfer of drones to the landlocked Andean nation.
After more than four decades of persistent, systematic penetration of Latin America, Iran is reaching its full geopolitical potential in the Western Hemisphere, prepositioning military assets and armaments in the region. Tehran’s goal is to bring the fight to the United States.
Core to Iran’s effort is developing a state and non-state proxy network in Latin America, much the same way Iran has done in the Middle East. Venezuela and Bolivia are at the top of the list.
The Broader Region Looks On
Bolivia is Iran’s most successful foreign policy project in Latin America. Prior to 2007, Iran had no diplomatic presence in Bolivia and virtually no bilateral relationship.
After Iran signed a strategic agreement with the Evo Morales-led government in September 2007, relations began to blossom. By 2010, Bolivia started buying military aircraft parts from Iran, and in 2012 the two nations signed an anti-narcotics accord. Bolivia hosted Iranian military officials under the auspices of fighting against drug trafficking. This accord, signed more than 10 years ago, forms the basis of the new Iran-Bolivia defense cooperation causing controversy in the region today.
One of the latest examples of such controversy came late last month when the Argentine Foreign Ministry asked Bolivia to explain its new defense agreement, which has drawn harsh criticism from the Argentine opposition. Buenos Aires was bombed twice by Hezbollah with the help of Iran in the 1990s.
Despite that, the leftwing Argentine government of President Alberto Fernandez has at best turned a blind eye to Iran’s inroads in South America. At worst, he has sent an active signal to Tehran that the time is right to formalize its ambition of staging a permanent military presence in the region.
Most notably, the Fernandez government failed to prosecute Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps pilots last year after a mysterious Iranian-Venezuelan cargo plane was grounded in Buenos Aires. At least one of the sanctioned IRGC pilots investigated, Gholamreza Ghasemi, traveled to Santa Cruz, Bolivia, in October 2022 after being released by Argentine authorities despite ample evidence of his membership in the feared Revolutionary Guards.
Fernandez’ approach to the IRGC pilots reflects the region’s passive approach to Iranian influence more broadly. Many simply look on as Venezuela, Bolivia, and others deepen their partnership with Iran.
Source: 1945