The plan is incredibly affordable and feasible from an economic standpoint and sits tight with the economic and geostrategic interests of Egypt, the US, Saudi Arabia and France.
Following is a summary of the feasible, immediate, and realistic plan for the rapid humanitarian relocation and rehabilitation in Egypt of the entire Arab population of the Gaza Strip.

In 2017, 10 million vacant apartments existed in Egypt, approximately 50% finished and 50% under construction. Two of the largest satellite cities of Cairo, “6th of October” and “10th
Ramadan,” have space for an additional 6 million residents, where there are a huge number of apartments for sale.

The typical cost of a 95-sqm three-bedroom apartment for the average Gaza family consisting of 5.14 persons in “6th of October” and “10th Ramadan” is 19,000 USD. This amounts to a total
cost of just $5 to $8 billion to be paid to Egypt by foreign donors.

The entire sum needed to finance the program is a mere 1% to 1.5% of Israel’s annual GDP and can be easily financed by Israel – even solely. As explained in the next section, an equity cash injection of $5 to $8
billion into the Egyptian economy would provide a tremendous, decisive benefit for the El-Sisi regime. These are ridiculously small amounts of money which can be doubled, tripled or even
quadrupled as needed in order to solve the issue of the Gaza Strip.

This sore point has long been disturbing not only the region, but the entire world’s peace, security, and stability. Spending a few billion dollars to solve the issue is a keenly innovative, viable option. On 12/16/2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new rescue loan of $3 billion for Egypt in the face of its deepening economic crisis.

Inflation rose to 26.5% in January 2023. The IMF recommended a shift to a flexible exchange rate, but this would exacerbate inflation and worsen the cost-of-living crisis. The Egyptian pound has lost half of its value since March 2022 (USD official exchange rate went up 95% from 15.7 to 30.7, much lower than the black-market rate), and this devaluation has already injured the Egyptian economy with highly-inflated food import costs. The private sector is struggling, and its output has declined for 26 consecutive months. The loan is also subject to the cessation of the privileges enjoyed by military-owned companies.

The IMF’s recommendations are meeting stiff resistance, while their implementation is extremely unlikely as this could jeopardize El-Sisi’s regime. The Egyptian government plans to offer stakes in 35 state-owned companies to strategic investors by the end of June 2024. To date, it has raised $5 billion, with another $5 billion in deals in the pipeline. "If the government achieved more progress in the IPO program and secured more financing from the Gulf States or from other partners, the CBE would adopt a more flexible exchange rate policy,” economist Hany Abul-Fotouh told Ahram Online.

“The second review of the IMF loan was scheduled for mid-September; however, the first review was not conducted in March 2023. The first and second reviews are to be conducted ahead of the 2023 Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and IMF in Morocco on October 8th", Fotouh pointed out Egypt's budget deficit accounted for 6% of its GDP in FY2022/2023. The country's debt-to-GDP ratio was estimated at 95.6% for FY2022/2023, with a GDP of EGP 9.8 trillion ($ 318.23 billion).

Egypt’s net foreign assets deficit reached $26.34 billion in July 2023. The net foreign asset deficit is the net total value of foreign assets owned by the country's banks minus their foreign liabilities. El-Sisi’s regime faces pressure to repay its debt, as investor confidence remains low.

What’s more, on 5 October 2023 Moody downgraded Egypt’s credit rating from B3 to Caa1, meaning that Egyptian government bonds now carry a "substantial risk." This is the lowest ever rating for the country. China is Egypt’s fourth largest creditor, as Egypt owes China $7.8 billion as of June 2023. Egypt is currently preparing to obtain a $500 million loan in Chinese yuan-dominated bonds to help plug a hole in its finances. Although part of the funding of Egypt’s administrative capital comes from Chinese investment and high-interest bonds, China has become cautious in financing Egypt due to Egypt’s economic woes.

Yet even if China tightens its purse strings, China wants to see the New Administrative Capital and other projects completed. China is currently focused on its relationships with the Gulf, while the economic survival of Egypt is important to the Gulf States. Should Egypt become highly indebted to China, far-reaching geopolitical implications will be created for the region.

This is a cause of great concern to the US, as Egypt’s default on China’s $8 billion loans and the subsequent possible Chinese control of strategic assets would constitute a strategic disaster for the US as well. Egypt’s other major creditors, which include Germany, France, and Saudi Arabia, may be calculating that losing out on their investments is a better outcome than seeing Egypt’s economy fail, thus they too have an incentive to try to keep Egypt afloat.

For all European countries, having Egypt taking care of the Gaza population with no risk of illegal emigration to Europe is a huge advantage. The same is true for Saudi Arabia, as the liquidation of the Gaza Strip would eliminate an Iranian ally.

This deal can be agreed to in principle between Netanyahu and El-Sisi within several days after the influx of Gazans into Egypt from the Rafah border has started. Currently, there are already hundreds of thousands of Gazans who wish to leave Gaza. The IDF needs to create the proper conditions for the Gaza Strip population to move to Egypt, together with (heavily financed) Egyptian cooperation on the other side of the border.

We must remember that some 2 million Gazans are just 2% of Egypt’s population which presently comprises 9 million refugees. A mere drop in the ocean. Clearly, such a program must have all the stars aligned to be feasible. At this very time, the stars have aligned. It is time for action. Now.

Source - Liberals in Likud