NEWSRAEL: The "obvious" assumption is: If Israel attacks Iran, Hezbollah will attack Israel with its 150,000 missiles.
The writer here says that that this is not so obvious and could very well not happen.

As tensions between Israel and Iran rise, against the backdrop of a round of nuclear talks with the superpowers and the possibility that the talks will fail, opinions in the media are growing as to how Israel should respond if it turns out that the Iranian nuclear threat is taking shape? 

Should Israel first deal militarily with the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israel on the more than 150,000 missiles in its possession, some of which can reach any point in Israel? Or is it estimated that Hezbollah's joining the campaign against Israel is an "unfounded" assumption under any circumstances and that Nasrallah has final and independent discretion?

The military commentator of the website Netziv.net - Guy A. Responds to the above questions:

The State of Israel does not look at the threats in this way, but also and especially weighs the response it has to the threats and the meaning of the threats. Although Hezbollah is close and well weaponized, in the end it is a treatable threat, both because Israel has been prepared for it for years and because it is a geographically delimited campaign. This will not be a month-long war, and no matter how complex and difficult it is, it is at the core of the IDF's readiness.

A war in Lebanon (and certainly also in Syria with or without Assad's army) will exhaust both the military and civilian sectors in Israel. 

This is exactly what Iran would like. 

By the same token, Israel does not allow itself to be dragged to Gaza so that Hezbollah cannot take advantage of the lack of watchful intelligence, so it is not dragged into Lebanon so that Iran does not take advantage of it. 

Routinely, Israel can handle intelligence in all the surrounding arenas and more, but in war all the focus and resources are drawn to the war arena.

Israel has always included in the scripts the possibility (which was once obvious but today not at all) that Hezbollah will be activated if we attack Iran, but surprisingly this may not happen. Israel attacks Iran again and again, eliminates the head of the nuclear project, kinetically sabotages the sites, partners in the assassination of Suleimani and Nasrallah? He takes a position of "uncommitted"… He sends the Iranians to retaliate independently.

Therefore, Israel will not be dragged into action in Lebanon as long as the threat from there can be addressed with the tools intended for it and the actual threat is even weakened (Lebanese internal restraint). If we reach a need or Hezbollah makes a mistake then we will fight against the organization.

In the nuclear field as far as action is required it will be done with tools that the Iranians will contain or respond to proportionately as to this day. They, too, will not want to lose Hezbollah so quickly, and the organization will not commit suicide on Iran's orders, certainly for a cyber attack that will harm them (this, by the way, also happens routinely without Israel having to even take responsibility).