After the IDF published its probe into Oct. 7, a former Unit 8200 commander tells JNS that the lack of a central alert mechanism is a critical factor.
Fundamental perceptions about the threat posed by Hamas and the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to respond effectively collapsed catastrophically on the morning of the Oct. 7, 2023, mass murder attacks, inquiries conducted by the Israeli military have found.
The first key lesson that emerges from the inquiries, according to an IDF official, is that “we cannot allow a threat to develop near the border. When choosing between prioritizing temporary quiet or removing the threat, the removal of the threat must be prioritized. It is not viable to ‘conflict manage’ against an enemy whose goal is your destruction.”
The inquiries, which examined a range of strategic and tactical systematic failures, were released on Feb. 27, and the outgoing IDF chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, stated on the same day, “The responsibility is mine. I was the commander of the military on October 7, and I also carry the weight of your responsibility.”