Whenever America tells us "Don't go to war" and we reply "Yes, but" – in 1948, in 1956, in 1967, in 1981 (destruction of the Iraqi reactor) – we earn respect from Washington. When we answer with, "Yes, alright" – as was the case in 1973, in 1991 (the first Gulf War) – we are looked at with contempt from the White House. Today, as Americans keep telling us "Don't go to war against Hezbollah and open a northern front", it is imperative that we look back at past such interactions. 

It's easy to see where President Joe Biden is coming from: Having put his political career on the line and angered some on the Left because of his support for Israel and opposition to a ceasefire in Gaza, he does not want to be dragged into another Middle Eastern war. This reluctance reflects not only the isolationist mindset in both the Democratic and Republican parties but also his concerns about getting into military entanglements overseas on the eve of the 2024 presidential election

In addition, the president is committed to the reconciliation between the United States and Iran, a policy championed since being devised by the Obama administration in 2009; he doesn't want more turbulence in the region.

Just over the weekend, after an Iranian missile was fired on an oil tanker in the Indian Ocean, the administration saw fit to point an accusing finger at Iran. Before that, the pro-Iranian forces in Syria and Iran had fired on American bases in the Middle East over 100 times and acted to close international shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait without the administration uttering a word against Iran. 

It is clear that an Israeli military move against Hezbollah could entangle the American naval forces in the area. These forces are there, among other things, to help us intercept Hezbollah's missile fire. But if one missile or drone hits an American destroyer, the United States could find itself involved in a war. In fact, those same forces serve as a deterrent against Hezbollah and Iran but also deter us, by giving the United States an effective veto over the scope of Israeli military activity

Therefore, the administration wants to see things resolved diplomatically by promoting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006, which Hezbollah has repeatedly violated while removing terrorists to a line beyond the Litani River. This move – even if successful – will not significantly change our security situation, because the moment we are part of this process, we will have to give up the military option

Israel faces an intolerable situation in the north and a threat that no sovereign state in the world would tolerate. Among Israeli decision-makers, there is hope that our victory over Hamas will deter Hezbollah, but that victory will likely take time. In the meantime, there is a danger that Hezbollah will wait until the IDF tires and American support for Israel wanes, and then it will open fire. 

Perhaps, like in 1973, if we let Hezbollah strike first we would get more American support, but we would pay a high price for it

Two months ago I asked in this column: "If not now, when?" Today I repeat this question: Are we willing to tell our allies "Yes, but", thereby earning not only our security but also their respect?

Source - Israel Hayom/X - Image - Reuters