John Spencer, the West Point Professor of Urban Warfare who concluded from his study of the IDF’s campaign in Gaza that “Israel implemented more precautions to prevent civilian harm than any military in history—above and beyond what international law requires,” has now offered thoughts on what Israel must do to “finish the job in Gaza.”

Hamas has refused to negotiate the return of hostages or discuss disarmament. In a brief exchange about his disappointment in Hamas, President Trump recently said, “It got to a point where you’re gonna have to finish the job.” But what does “finishing the job” in Gaza actually mean? What options remain, what is likely to happen next, and what would help?
Global recognition of Israel’s legitimate and just war objectives must be the starting point. Many voices calling for an immediate ceasefire argue, implicitly or explicitly, that the war can end without removing Hamas’s military capabilities or political power. Some even suggest that if Hamas were to return the hostages, often in exchange for hundreds of prisoners, the war should stop.

Spencer argues that Hamas is like a tumor that, unless it is completely removed, can grow back and again become a threat to the existence of the Jewish state. It must not be allowed to retain any power, military or political, in Gaza, because if it is left standing, even if greatly weakened, it will present itself to the world as having won a victory. And it will attract new recruits to replace those killed by the IDF, rebuild those of its tunnels that the IDF had destroyed, and renew its supply of weapons, smuggled in from Egypt at the Rafah Crossing, to be turned against the hated Jews.

Humanitarian assistance should not prolong Hamas’s rule. That means aid must be delivered through mechanisms that do not rely on or empower Hamas. The U.S.–Israeli initiative known as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), launched in May, has demonstrated a successful model. In just five weeks, GHF has delivered nearly 100 million meals directly to civilians, feeding one to two million Gazans per day. The key is bypassing Hamas and removing food from its system of control and coercion. By restoring food access outside of Hamas control, Israel helps shift civilian reliance away from the terror group’s shadow governance.

Israel is now delivering aid in massive amounts through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, aid which so far Hamas has been unable to steal, as it did so readily when the aid was being distributed by Hamas-linked UNRWA. The GHF has provided more than 91 million meals to Gazans just since May.

While headlines often focus on Hamas-driven chaos and warnings of famine, the reality on the ground is beginning to shift. More food is now flowing into Gaza. Hundreds of United Nations aid trucks are being distributed daily. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) continues to deliver up to two million meals a day across four sites. It has also established a system that allows approved groups to pick up aid and deliver it to the most vulnerable areas.

Since the beginning of the war, Israel has facilitated the entry into Gaza of 94,000 truckloads of aid. And since the GHF started sending in food in May, the Israel-backed group has provided 1.5 million meals to Gazans. Yet much of the world insists that Israel is “deliberately starving” the people of Gaza. The only group starving the people of Gaza is Hamas, which systematically steals aid in order to resell it to the Gazans to whom it was supposed to be provided for free.

The Israel Defense Forces will continue to re-enter contested areas to systematically target Hamas fighters, collect intelligence on the location of hostages, dismantle Hamas infrastructure, and clear Gaza of their military presence.

The IDF now controls about 75-80% of Gaza. It is in the process of destroying Hamas in the remaining 20-25% of the Strip, mostly in northern Gaza. It still has hundreds of miles of tunnels to find and destroy as well. This effort to take over the part of Gaza where Hamas is still a threat has to be done in a capillary fashion, neighborhood by neighborhood, even house by house. Trump wants the Israelis to hurry up and “finish the job” of destroying Hamas, but may not realize that with practically every building boobytrapped by Hamas, the IDF has to be slow and methodical in its searches and in setting off controlled explosions. This can’t be rushed.

To be clear, this is not a call for a forever war in Gaza. This is a clear-eyed statement of what it will take to accomplish step one of the “clear, hold, build” model. There can be no holding or building anything until the guns are taken from Hamas. Defeating Hamas’s control over territory and the population is the essential first step. Nothing else can exist in Gaza until that is done.

Until Hamas is eradicated in Gaza, Israel cannot make plans for “the day after.” Who will take control of the Strip? The Palestinian Authority is one possibility, but like the leaders of Hamas, those who head the PA have a long record of diverting aid to their own account. Mahmoud Abbas and his two sons Yasser and Tareq have amassed a family fortune of $400 million; his loyalists have had to be content with a few million apiece. And Abbas is unlikely to be approved of by the Israelis to take over Gaza for another reason. Mahmoud Abbas insists he will continue with his “Pay-For-Slay” program, that provides large monthly stipends to imprisoned terrorists and to the families of terrorists killed during their attacks, which means he wants to reward past and incentivize future acts of terror. This should make Abbas, and the PA, unacceptable to Israel, and to the United States, as the future rulers of Gaza.

Another, much more acceptable possibility, is for one or more of the Sunni Arab countries of the Gulf to take over in Gaza. The most likely candidate is the UAE, that is virulently opposed to Hamas, is the Arab state most friendly toward Israel, and possesses the deep pockets — the hundreds of billions of dollars — that will be necessary to rebuild infrastructure in Gaza.

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