Normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is inevitable. It is already well underway and has been for some years, even if not yet formally and publicly recognised.

Many commentators believe that official diplomatic recognition might founder on the Palestinian issue, with Saudi demanding compromises that Israel cannot meet. That is not so. The 2020 Abraham Accords were established without any Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, and they were agreed with the UAE and Bahrain, and later Morocco and Sudan, with complete Saudi backing, albeit behind the scenes.

That tells you everything about Saudi’s actual perspective on the Palestinian question, notwithstanding public comments such as those of the Saudi ambassador to the Palestinians who said during a recent visit to Ramallah that the Arab Peace Initiative “is a fundamental pillar of any upcoming agreement”.

The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative conditions Arab recognition of Israel on the latter’s withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, Gaza and the Golan Heights, return of refugees and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The Saudis know better than most that no such thing is possible and I was told as much by officials during meetings in Riyadh a few years ago. They know that not only would Israel be endangering its citizens and its very existence but also that most Palestinians do not want it either: a poll this month by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research shows that a significant majority oppose the idea of a two-state solution.

If the Saudis genuinely felt that normalisation was dependent on substantive Israeli concessions to the Palestinians they would not continue to pursue negotiations towards an unachievable goal. We would not have heard Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently tell Fox News that normalization is getting “closer” every day.

PA leadership know they can do nothing to prevent normalization

But as leader of the Arab and Muslim world, the Kingdom is obliged to show public support for its Palestinian brothers. In reality, it will probably settle for Israeli gestures such as statements of intent and perhaps repudiation of any annexation plans, while restoring significant Saudi funding to the Palestinian Authority. The latter is sorely needed by the PA leadership, who know they can do nothing to prevent normalization anyway if Riyadh decides on it and might as well cash in.

Economic benefits accruing from normalisation are high up on Saudi’s agenda, but its top priority is security and regime stability, upon which all else depends. Here Iran remains Riyadh’s number one concern, despite restoration of diplomatic relations, as well as the continuing threat of overthrow by Islamic jihadists. Memories of the “Arab Spring” have not faded.

On both fronts, Israel can, and has, assisted even without normalisation, and would be in a position to do much more under open diplomatic relations. The real prize, though, is the U.S., from which Saudi is looking for a firm defence treaty, supply of advanced weaponry such as F35 combat planes and ATACMS long-range missiles as well as provision of civil nuclear capabilities. Each of these could be problematic for Israel given its need to maintain military superiority in the region; but, with the necessary safeguards, Jerusalem will accede given the overwhelming strategic benefits of normalization.

The real decider will be the administration in Washington

So is the stage set for normalization between Israel and Saudi as part of a wider agreement with the U.S.? The political challenges in Israel, with divergences in the coalition, especially on even token concessions to the Palestinians, as well as resistance to the nuclear elements from the opposition, should not be underestimated. But the real decider will be the administration in Washington.

MBS knows exactly what he wants and recognises that he currently has a unique opportunity to achieve it. With the growing strength of the China-Iran-Russia axis in the Middle East, the U.S. needs to do all it can to push back, especially against China. Tighter relations with Saudi Arabia, and the Western-facing economic and military projects that will go along with that, are important means to serve U.S. strategic objectives, to some extent a reversal of the Obama pivot away from the Middle East which has so demonstrably failed.

MBS also knows that Biden is desperate for foreign policy success in advance of the election. Even if he doesn’t actually stand in 2024, he still needs a Democratic Party victory — and a legacy for himself. Foreign affairs will not be the determining factor in the presidential race, but it could certainly help tip the balance in a tightly fought contest. 

Here, a historic peace deal between Saudi Arabia and one of America’s most popular allies, brokered by the president, will have more appeal to ordinary voters than the other strategic advantages, which is the reason normalisation with Israel has been given so much prominence in DC.

As I have said, Saudi understands a two-state solution is not possible. Biden, however, with advisers such as John Kerry, does not understand that and there is little doubt that he is pressing Saudi to demand it. Unless wiser counsels prevail in Washington the unattainable obsessions of the outdated peace processors could yet again frustrate historic progress in the Middle East.

Source: Ynet