It was allowed to be published that in recent months, Iranian security officials have worked to recruit and employ Israeli citizens, in order to carry out security missions, while presenting a false representation to them, that it is an innocent application. In this activity the Shin Bet thwarted an attempted attack, in which an Israeli agency was approached under criminal cover.

The appeal to the Israeli citizens was carried out through social platforms as well as through websites that offer occasional paid jobs, including on Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter (X), in various languages (among others - Hebrew, Arabic, English), while the same parties use a variety of false representations in front of them Israelis for the benefit of establishing an initial relationship with them - apartment brokers, parties interested in the marketing and sale of drones, courier services, requests for photo shoots, online dating, contacting private investigators and more.

In accordance with the various misrepresentations, the Israeli citizens were asked to perform various "tasks" for monetary compensation, which are perceived as those that do not apparently relate to security aspects, but those that definitely have to serve the Iranians and enrich the intelligence they have - taking photographs, finding out addresses, and more. Some of the Israeli citizens who received such suspicious inquiries, avoided responding to them and even alerted security officials in Israel about them.

This is a known *method of operation of the Iranian security agencies as a platform for the random recruitment of Israeli citizens, in order to carry out seemingly innocent missions, which have an intelligence motive on the basis of which they can act to promote plans to harm Israeli citizens.

Since the beginning of the war, it is evident that the activity efforts of the Iranian security forces have greatly intensified, while the use of the digital space for the purposes of intimidation, conveying messages or promoting disguised terrorist activity is increasing widely. Its purpose is to assist Hamas in its war and to damage Israel's national resilience and war effort, sowing demoralization and deepening social divisions.*

Among other things, platforms pretending to be Israeli are identified, which make cynical and manipulative use of the 10/7 hostage issue and even try to act against families of hostages and bereaved families.

As part of the use of advanced tools and capabilities for the purpose of locating these attempts and completing them The General Security Service (Shabak) located and monitored many fictitious profiles on social media used by the Iranian security forces, a lot of information was collected about the identity of those factors behind the activation of the profiles, and steps were taken accordingly.

- Correspondence of Israeli citizens with the Iranian security officials - applying with a false identity of young women through the networks, including a request for murder and payment for it. Application through a website that connects job seekers with service providers.

- Recording of a conversation between the Iranian agent and the Israeli citizen, in which the Iranian agent persuades the Israeli to the approach site, to come and photograph a house for him in Israel for a payment of 100 dollars.

- As part of the countermeasures, a videotaped message was sent from the Shin Bet to the Iranian security forces that were operating against Israel:

"We have been closely following your empty efforts for a long time. We uncovered many of the targets and managed to thwart your plans. All your activities in front of Israeli citizens, Arabs and Jews, are under the strict control and supervision of the Shin Bet and will be immediately thwarted. I warn you, playing with fire has serious and dangerous consequences.'